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THE QUEST FOR A POST-METAPHYSICAL ACCESS
TO THE HUMAN: FROM MARCEL TO HEIDEGGER
ERNST WOLFF
1. Introduction
My decision to look at the work of Gabriel Marcel, despite the marginal
position that scholars currently accord him, was motivated by my conviction
that, from a historical perspective, he represents a pivotal position in French
philosophy: his thought represents a hinge between the heritage of nineteenth-
century philosophy and the reception of phenomenology and in particular the
philosophy of Heidegger. 
The heading of the last section of the current essay is “From Marcel to
Heidegger – an appreciation”. It would be incorrect to assume that it suggests
that I attempt to “rehabilitate” Marcel, as if once one “really” understands
Marcel, his work will show Heidegger’s to be redundant or marginal – I make
no such attempt. Nor is this an attempt to elevate Marcel to the position of a
French master thinker from whom Heidegger took over the baton. Likewise,
the reader should not expect a demonstration of the manner in which Heidegger
accomplished everything and thus rendered Marcel redundant. Instead, I chose
the word “appreciation” circumspectly, not only to indicate that in my
conclusion I present an appraisal of the intersection between the work of Marcel
and Heidegger (and the term “intersection” refers here to a historical transition
or a shift), but also to show that it is my intention to appreciate their work in the
sense of showing consideration and gratitude for it. One can indeed show one’s
appreciation for the work of one’s predecessors by submitting their work to
thorough scrutiny and criticism, but also by the recognition that one gives to the
fact that, as a scholar, one has been constituted by the historical event of the
work of these great thinkers and by the reception thereof.
Clearly this objective justifies a lengthy monograph. However, in order to
restrict this study to the length of an article, I delimit the material as set out
below, and present it in three movements. 
First, the articulation of the relation between the two thinkers’ oeuvres is
narrowed down to the central issue of the quest for a post-metaphysical access
to the human. This is done by a historical and thematic contextualisation of the
point at which their work overlaps within twentieth-century philosophy. 
Second, Marcel and Heidegger are presented in turn to indicate how this
issue fits into their work and how they address it. Attention is paid to the way
in which their thought should be situated in relation to each other’s thought:
whereas the similarities will be highlighted in order to establish the comparison,
the dissimilarities will also be indicated in order to respect the peculiarity of
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both philosophers’ project. No attempt will be made to fit them into a makeshift,
encompassing phenomenological framework that no historical author ever
defended. The focus, in both cases, is on their earlier work (although I do refer
to later texts to clarify the earlier ones). This focus appears to be justified by the
fact that the early work of Marcel, which was written independently from that
of Heidegger, partially precedes and partially informs the courant of
existentialist thought that is, to some extent, responsible for Heidegger’s good
reception in France. No stretch of the imagination allows a reduction of
Marcel’s later work to a mere response to his discovery of Heidegger’s work.
However, the question concerning their relation changes markedly in Marcel’s
later work, since it is clear that these texts, to some extent, form part of the
subsequent history of the reception of Heidegger in France.1
Third, an appreciation is given of the moment of French intellectual history
represented by the transitional junction that co-ordinates (from our current
perspective) the shift from Marcel to Heidegger – not, I repeat, as a shift caused
by one master thinker taking over, putting an end to the work of a former
master, but a moment in which the independent creative work of two original
thinkers flowed together in a historically contingent situation that recognised
Marcel’s influence on the French intellectual scene, which has subsequently
proven to be so receptive to Heidegger.
2. Historical and thematic orientation
The important position that Marcel held in the French intellectual scene on
the eve of one of the most fascinating eras of Western philosophy can be
explained by noting two themes that also stand at the centre of the fascination
that Heidegger has subsequently exercised in the same environment. These two
themes that are so intimately interconnected and that have been such a decisive
strand of the story of French philosophy in the twentieth century are the topics
of subject and humanism, or more precisely of their criticism. These twin
themes have, of course, their roots in the nineteenth century and even further
back, but it was particularly the intellectual developments between the two
World Wars that paved the way for the momentum which this topic gained in
the aftermath of the Second World War, and even more so since the 1960s. The
incessant work on these twin themes is one of the most significant means by
which philosophers of the last three generations have thought through the
cultural and political heritage of the Western world. 
A serious critical stock-taking of Western culture was necessitated by the
terrible consequences of National Socialist totalitarianism and its sphere of
influence (as well as by other political events, such as the collapse of the
colonial system). How could the terrible violence of these events be understood?
What defects in Western culture contributed to and made these events possible?
Where are the hidden sources of totalitarian violence still effective within
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society? A diagnosis of the problem was summarised provocatively by Philippe
Lacoue-Labarthe: “Nazism is a humanism”.2 One could reformulate the
implications of this comment by arguing that the generic disease that Western
culture carries within itself and that manifests itself in a variety of totalitarian,
violent forms of conduct (fascism, colonialism, sexism, etc., but that is also to
be found in technics, science, therapy and, alas, philosophy itself) is humanism.
In this context, humanism can be understood as a collective term for projects
that are devised and executed in the name of humanity and that owe their origin
to a certain notion of subjectivity. To put this differently: the critics of
humanism are critical of the metaphysical subject (they consider the
metaphysical subject to be characterised by its being the self-reflective,
autonomous, free founder of its own fate),3 because it would be the logical point
of departure from whence projects are invented and programmatically realised
following humanistic values. In short, throughout the wide variety of forms of
expression of Western culture, the underlying notion of subjectivity can be
traced and it can be demonstrated that the supposedly autonomous, free, self-
identical, foundational subject is at the root of violent excesses.
By contrast, as opposed to the fundamental position awarded to the subject
in traditional metaphysics (according to its critics), the autonomy of the subject
is now being problematised in many different ways. This is being done by the
introduction of a series of notions of unconscious powers that work their effects
on the subject. The analysis of unconscious powers exposes decisively the
decentredness of the supposedly autonomous subject and tends towards a point
where subjectivity would be eliminated. These descriptions, which are
genealogical in one sense or another, were inspired particularly by Marx, Freud
and Nietzsche, but a more recent invitation to continue this endeavour can be
found in the work of Heidegger.
Already in Sein und Zeit, Heidegger took upon himself the task of a
“destruction” of traditional ontology.4 By this he understood an appropriation
of Western metaphysics by means of a phenomenological deconstruction of its
notions, and of these notions, the subject is one of the most important. This was
followed by his anti-humanist texts, of which the Letter on Humanism, the
Vorträge und Aufsätze and the two volumes on Nietzsche enjoyed a particularly
rich reception among French philosophers (although the precise nature and
depth of the influence of these works on them obviously differed from one
philosopher to another). 
Apart from the historical orientation that it provides, this brief sketch of the
historical situation aims to highlight the importance of Heidegger for French
philosophy.5 Once one has remembered this importance, it is easier to indicate
the role that Marcel has played in the pre-history of this development. Criticism
of a certain notion of the subject and the attempts to think non-metaphysically
beyond it – this is the theme in relation to which I present Marcel and Heidegger.
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Whatever the continuities and caesuras might be between Marcel and the later
French philosophers of the twentieth century, Marcel is co-responsible for the
momentum gained by this central theme: a quest for ways in which to reflect
that could problematise the metaphysical6 subject and propose an alternative to
it – in favour of what Marcel considers a more humane existence. 
I do not ignore the fact that Heidegger’s spectacular reception in France after
the Second World War remains in many respects somewhat of a mystery.7 For
the purposes of the current essay, however, it suffices to recall that the fact that
Heidegger was, often by means of the anthropologising reading that most of
the earliest French readers gave of his work, (incorrectly) connected with
existentialism, which was highly influential at that stage, played a role in his
popularity in the French intellectual sphere. Marcel, despite his later explicit
rejection of the “dreadful appellation of existentialism” to his work,8 not only
formed part of the general movement, but was also one of its important
precursors in France.9
3. Marcel: recognition of the existential mystery
The term “quest for a post-metaphysical access to the human” in the title of
this article is particularly apposite for Marcel: he did engage in a quest, meaning
that he remained true to a world that he attempted to leave behind, as was also
the case with so many other philosophers of the previous century. In order to
be able to appreciate the originality of his attempt, one should recall the
intellectual context in which his thought arose. The philosophical world in
France in which Marcel commenced his intellectual itinerary when, between
1906 and 1910, he was a student at the Sorbonne (in other words, the world
that he attempted to a considerable extent to leave behind), was characterised
by three currents of thought: scientific positivism, rationalistic Idealism and a
tradition of French spiritualism.10 One has to bear in mind (if we leave aside two
or three early commentaries) that it was still to be a good twenty years before
Husserl burst onto the French philosophical scene, almost at the same time as
Heidegger. However, Heidegger only became really popular after the Second
World War, initially with Sartre’s existentialism and later in the predominant
opposition to Sartre’s existentialism in the Heidegger reception.
In his presentation of twentieth-century French philosophy, Jean-Michel le
Lannou indicates quite correctly that Marcel initiated, in opposition to Léon
Brunschvicg, the wide-spread quest for a non-idealistic philosophy. It was
considered necessary to overcome idealism because, according to its critics,
idealism desubstantialised and denaturalised Being, life, the human being.11 In
his effort to find a resubstantialising or renaturalising philosophy, Marcel
developed a new philosophical style: far from proposing a quest for supra-
temporal, universal truths through the systematic conquering of the particular
and the temporal, he valued and sought the concrete and particular.12 In this
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double effort to escape from what was available in philosophy at the time,
namely by overcoming a denaturalising idealism and proposing the
philosophical appreciation of the concrete, particular event, Marcel anticipates
the work of philosophers such as Merleau-Ponty, Ricoeur and Henry –
important representatives of the reception of Heidegger.
But where does Marcel start? What drove his quest? What is his central
question?
3.1 Beginning after the beginning; tracing the elusive origin
Twenty years after the publication of his first important work, the Journal
Métaphysique (1927, contemporaneous with Sein und Zeit),13 Marcel writes
that “the development of my reflection has been to a large degree an explanation
[of my life]. It seems as if everything happened as if I have only succeeded in
progressively dealing with that which at first had only been lived experience for
me as matter for reflection.”14 Marcel’s central problem is the human being,
and in particular the one that he is himself. Marcel wrote a lot on Being, but he
gives definite priority to the question of the human being. The point of departure
of Marcel’s philosophical itinerary thus has quite a different focus from that of
his contemporary, Heidegger, for whom the question concerning the meaning
of the verb “to be” is the greatest puzzle (I come back to this point later). This
particular perspective should be included in one’s reading of Marcel: his is a
quest for a kind of reflection that bears the “bite marks of what is real”, for one
that is constantly taken up in the movement of life itself.15
3.2 Ontological status of the question of the human being as bodily subject
The human being as question to himself or herself is then a landmark in the
landscape of Marcel’s thinking. The manner in which the human being is
reflectively approached has consequences for ontology, epistemology, culture,
ethics, and so on.
The human being questions himself or herself, asking: Who or what am I?
Who is this I that is capable of posing this and other questions?16 (and the
presentation of the prominent place that the capacity of Dasein to question and
to interrogate itself about itself plays in Sein und Zeit, should already be
anticipated here). This I, says Marcel, is the one that has always already existed,
even before I have posed this or any other question. There is someone that
precedes any interrogation, because without such a person no question would
have been posed. From this, Marcel concludes that this I is someone that could
never become the direct object of an inquiry; it escapes this inquiry in the sense
that it had always already been effective for reflection before the event by which
it is questioningly thematised.17 Thus the existence of the interrogator always
precedes the event of interrogation and thus enables the interrogation that aims
at taking it as object of reflection.
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At first glance, it seems as if in this view, Marcel is not too far from
Descartes18 and the essence of the metaphysical subject: the person that
interrogates or doubts cannot doubt his or her own existence, since the fact of
doubting or interrogating presupposes the existence of the one that interrogates
or doubts. However, there are a number of decisive differences. For Descartes,
his methodical doubt leads to the assurance that he as the subject has this
thinking subject as an indisputable and transparent point of departure for the
progressive development of his philosophy. The subject of the cogito is a
bodiless epistemological subject, the type that leads Descartes into an
unsolvable dualism. Be this as it may, this subject serves as the foundation and
point of departure of a system of thinking that ideally realises its aspiration of
being all-encompassing. Marcel differs from Descartes on two significant
points.
First, for Marcel, the I becomes someone that is outside of, or rather,
precedes the questioning, and that for this reason can never be placed opposite
the questioner, since the I enables the questioning. This position is of
considerable importance. It implies that Marcel departs from all desire to
construct a total or all-encompassing system of knowledge, since the existence
of the subject can never be completely recovered for representation. The human
being is of such a type of reality that it can never be fully turned into a theme
of inquiry. Existence precedes, conditions and escapes full recovery by thought,
or to put it more like Marcel himself does: “Being has primacy over knowledge
(not Being as it is affirmed, but Being affirming itself)”.19 And since the
existence of the human being can never be brought exhaustively to re-
presentation, the metaphysical notion of the subject as hupokeimenon, as basis
or substrate, is thereby seriously problematised (however, as one can deduce
from Marcel’s specific usage of the notion of “participation”, he did not leave
behind this notion completely – see discussion below). This perspective on the
human being, one that was probably inspired by the later Schelling and that
was intended to be in direct opposition to the absolute ego of idealism,
resembles at least partially – as I will show – the thrownness (Geworfenheit) of
Heideggerian Dasein. 
But what is this type of reality that the human being has and that is of this
strange nature? This is the second important point of difference between Marcel
and Descartes: Marcel conceives of the subject of questioning (the “I question”)
as non-decomposable, as a unity, as a subject-body or as an incarnate subject.
My body is not simply another one amongst the objects of this world; my body
is different from those objects, in that it is mine. Strictly speaking, my body is
not an object – what I call my body can never be placed completely objectively
in order to be examined objectively, since I am the body that is to undertake
such an objectivation. I am my body, I do not make use of my body as I use a
tool. Furthermore, the fact that I can say of a certain object (my body) that it is
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mine, and this in a manner in which I say it of no other object and which no
other person can claim of the same object in the same manner, indicates for
Marcel that the body is always already an object. The interval between me and
my body that would have been needed in order to objectify it is denied. The
existence that I can share with nobody is an incarnate existence. For Marcel,
incarnation means exclusively “the situation of a being that appears to itself as
fundamentally, and not accidentally, linked to itself”.20 For him, the subject as
body is the central point of reference of (a newly conceived) metaphysical
thought21 and it is in the importance awarded to reflection on the body that we
find one of the most salient points of divergence with Heidegger’s reflection.
The human being as incarnate subject is that “thing” which is not only itself, but
is the “thing” that interrogates itself about its own existence. 
That the question concerning who or what I am presupposes a bodily subject,
constitutes for Marcel the ontological status of the questioning: the fact that a
question is posed in fact testifies to a certain existence, an existence that is not
primarily the result of being posed by judgement (that something exists), but an
existence that affirms itself, amongst other things, in the event of questioning.
This questioning has an ontological status,22 thanks to the questioning body.
The body thus becomes the bridge by which Marcel enters ontology; the body
is the manner in which the subject participates in Being and gains access to it. 
There can be no doubt that Marcel’s notion of the body retains some
metaphysical remnants, whether we find them in association with the notion of
“existence”, as in the earlier texts, or in association with the notion of “Being”,
as in the later texts. Sometimes, for example, when Marcel presents the body
as “participating” in existence or Being, it seems as if incarnation allows the
human being direct presence23 and participation in an ontological substrate.
However, it is difficult to make an unequivocal judgement on this issue, because
of a certain fluidity with which Marcel uses the notions of “existence” and
“Being”: whereas in some cases they are presented more like a substrate, in
other cases, their verbal character or again their mysterious elusiveness come
clearly to the fore. This ambiguity in Marcel’s dealing with the ontological
status of the bodily subject marks, perhaps better than any other part of his
philosophy, his position as a pivot between the pre-Heideggerian French
philosophy, and that initiated by the German philosopher. Whereas the
recognition of this ambiguity already indicates the preparation of fertile soil for
the reception of Heidegger’s Dasein (and this simultaneously implies taking
critical distance from Marcel), it must be stressed here that this option for the
radical phenomenology of Heidegger should not, as is so often done, be taken
to imply retroactively an unequivocal condemnation of an author such as Marcel
– one reads for instance: “[M]y interrogation concerning Being presupposes an
affirmation in which I would in some way be passive, and of which I would be
the seat rather than the subject. But this is only a limit and I cannot realise it
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without contradiction. I orientate myself thus towards the position or the
recognition of a participation that has the reality of a subject; this participation
could, by its very definition, not be an object of thought”.24 This sophisticated
formulation, evidently formulated in Marcel’s own language, indicates clearly
the author’s desire to argue for a destabilisation of a subject as foundation or
hupokeimenon in the direction of an originary temporality and the non-
transparency thereof.
3.3 Problem and mystery – first and second reflection
It is exactly this temporality and non-transparency of the bodily subject as
participating in Being that requires considering anew the form of interrogation
of the human being by himself or herself. How does one, for instance,
interrogate oneself about the fact of being incarnate, and how does one speak
about it if “strictly speaking it is not a fact, but a given from which a fact
becomes only possible”?25 In order to respond to this challenge, Marcel
distinguishes between two kinds of interrogatory dispositions or strategies, and
these in turn require two different ways of responding.
The first strategy by which the matter of interrogation is dealt with as a
problem, consists of posing the matter at hand in front of or opposite the
investigator as a Gegen-stand, that is as ob-iectum (following the etymology
also found in Heidegger). The intention of the problem as a form of
interrogation is to solve the problem and to generate new problems from that
solution, and so forth. 
Following the second strategy, the matter of interrogation imposes itself, as
it were, on the investigator as a mystery, or as Marcel also calls it, as a meta-
problem.26 In Position et approches concrètes du mystère ontologique, a long
series of examples of mysteries are submitted to scrutiny: my body, evil, love,
creative fidelity, encounter, hope, absence and availability and holiness. What
each of these cases has in common with the mystery of my own body is that the
investigating subject is himself or herself constituted by the mystery – the event
and after-effects of an encounter, of evil or of hope give birth to the person that
can only retrospectively interrogate himself or herself about the constituting
events. Even if mysteries are called “ontological” and the metaphor of
participation in a substrate remains at least implicitly at work, the radical
temporality of the mystery should be noted along with its non-transparency: “It
is only by a kind of denial or treason that I could say: ‘After all, it [any mystery
– EW] could just as well not have happened, I would have remained the same
as I had been, the one that I am still.’ And one shouldn’t say either: I have been
modified by it as by an external cause. No, it developed me from within, it has
worked with me as a principle internal to me.”27 The changeability of the human
being is the reason why in Marcel’s thinking there can be no fixed metaphysics
of Being; his metaphysics is of such a nature that it could best be written in a
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diary, in other words, literally progressively as the ontological mystery develops
through time.28 The character of mysteries makes it necessary to take the
particular contingencies of the individual life seriously, because it is precisely
there that the ontological mystery manifests itself in a plurality of ways.
Two ways of thinking correspond with this distinction between the
problematic and the mystical dispositions of interrogation. The first is called
“first reflection” because, according to Marcel, it represents the spontaneous
way in which people deal with questions in their initial encounter with these
questions. Usually this manner of thinking aims at general, impersonal
judgements. This entails that reason abstracts the particular from its specific
surroundings, from its attachment to a contingent situation and (in the case of
human beings) often from their incarnation. It is, as one might easily suspect,
when the matter of interrogation is a human being that the insufficiencies of
this way of thinking come to the fore: in first reflection any particular human
being tends to be interchangeable with any other human being. The fact that
human beings do indeed lend themselves to reflection in this manner and that
this manner of reflecting on them is not simply undesirable can be demonstrated
by the use made of this mode of reflection in the medical sciences. However,
Marcel was concerned about the generalised, one-sided use of first reflection,
and this is at the heart of his criticism of a number of modern social pathologies. 
Marcel calls the second manner of thinking, which he considers the
appropriate manner to approach mysteries, “second reflection”, “reflection of
the second order”, “recovering reflection”, or “contemplating recollection”.
These appellations make it clear that the second reflection often follows the
first, spontaneous reflection, with the effect that it has to reflect differently on
its subject matter; it has to reflect again afterwards about something in order to
regain or recover something that was lost in the first reflection. “In the midst of
the recollection I take position – or more exactly, I prepare myself to take
position, – opposite my life, I withdraw myself from it as it were, but not as the
pure subject of knowledge; in this withdrawal I take with me what I am and
what my life is perhaps not.”29 This paradoxical description of what Marcel
means by recollection or second reflection signifies simply that the spontaneous
manner of dealing with things is temporarily suspended, but that the structure
of the investigator as constituted by the mystery is not changed by the second
reflection.
Although there is no direct influence from phenomenology on Marcel (at
least in the first developments of his work), there is undeniably a kind of
“reduction” at work here – not, of course, to lay bare a transcendental subject
of some kind, but to provide a genealogy (one that remains in principle
unfinishable) of the multiple experiences of lived-through subjectivity.30
Through a continuous process of recollecting thought, the I testifies to that
which constitutes that I most intimately. This is why Ricoeur calls the second
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reflection “indirect speech”31 – something that initially comes to my mind only
as an intuition is gradually more and more related. Although the ontologico-
hermeneutic framework of Heidegger’s early thought is not found here, the
important passage from the pre-predicative level of implicit ontology that one
is oneself to a secondary rendering of that in a propositional discourse (logos
apophantikos) is undeniably similar.
The uniqueness of the Marcelian body-subject and the recollecting indirect
speech concerning the constitution thereof by mysteries can be articulated
further by changing our perspective: looking from Heidegger to Marcel.
4. Heidegger and the “subjectivity” of Dasein as the question concerning Being
As important as the deconstructed subject – Dasein – may be for the early
work of Heidegger, his concern is nonetheless not to say something about the
human being. Heidegger was interested in the meaning of Being or, more
precisely, the meaning of the verb “to be”. It is first and foremost in the context
of this question that one particular kind of being, namely Dasein, becomes
important for him. Dasein is the human being, but Heidegger does not develop
an anthropology.32
Dasein is important, on the one hand, because it is the only being that
interrogates itself explicitly concerning Being, and on the other hand, because
Dasein is the being that exists in such a manner that it is always and in all
respects busy understanding Being in one way or another. The entire existence
of Dasein is an event through which Being is understood; Dasein is ontology.33
Heidegger explains the manner of being of Dasein in such a way that he
ontologises the intentional structure of consciousness as described by Husserl.
The manner of being of the being that always understands Being in an
“intentional” manner is existence. Heidegger calls this particular manner of
being, namely existence, by different names, amongst others “transcendent”,
“ek-static”, “metaphysic”. It is vital to understand that Dasein is the place where
the difference between the verb “to be” and the things that are becomes
perceivable; Dasein is the happening of the ontological difference. This happens
in that Dasein stands out of its own existence as being (according to
Heidegger’s etymological usage of the word “existence”), in that Dasein
exceeds or transcends itself into the Being-as-verb. Dasein is the only event by
which we can get access to the verbality of Being, or time.
4.1 Heidegger and Descartes
I have already alluded to the central position that the notion of the “subject”
takes in Heidegger’s programme of a phenomenological deconstruction of
Western metaphysics. The preceding discussion should already have shown
that the Cartesian cogito (that in the context of this programme is taken by
Heidegger as his exemplum) produces a number of problems for Marcel. What
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Heidegger identifies as problematic in the cogito is that the reflection on the
manner of being of the I (that is, the meaning of the sum) does not get away
from the description thereof as res cogitans (as thinking thing).34 Despite his
claims to the contrary, Descartes continues medieval metaphysics when he
attempts to establish the res cogitans as the fundamentum inconcussum, the
unshakable ground of all knowledge (as has also been argued by other scholars). 
The cogito, as Heidegger explained later,35 belongs to an era of metaphysics
that was characterised by two prejudices. On the one hand, metaphysics
attempts to find a hold on the beings by placing them, as it were, opposite the
investigator in a clear and distinct manner – the truth that is sought in this way
obtains an objective certainty that is founded on the certainty of the
representation (Vor-stellung). On the other hand, these representations rest on
the foundation that the subject would be itself, namely as substrate or base. The
subject would be more objective than any object. Consequently, in order to be
valid, every cogitatio (thought concerning a being) has to refer to the thinking
thing (res cogitans), that is, to the subject.36 The presence of the res cogitans is
required for every true re-presentation of beings.37
Now we can understand why Heidegger opposes the Cartesian cogito: as a
result of this double prejudice, Descartes understands the subject from the outset
as a thing that is simply present.38 If the subject and the essence of the existence
of the subject are understood from the outset as objective presence, as a thing
from which one can make re-presentations (in the sense explained above), the
existence of Dasein as temporal and ek-static is lost from sight and the subject
is degraded to a carrier of qualities.
What the first Heidegger opposes to this is a hermeneutics of the possibilities
of the meaning of the verb “to be”, in so far as it is involved in the existence of
Dasein. Dasein is – as I have already stated – that being by which the question
concerning the meaning of Being arises; it is precisely this question that makes
of Dasein a unique being in distinction to whatever objectified thing. Dasein
interrogates itself, not concerning itself, but concerning the Being of which
Dasein itself is the event of (its) understanding. Dasein is not an I, in the form
of a subiectum, but a question concerning that which Dasein always is already.39
One key to Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein that is important to us here is his
reinterpretation of the phenomenological reduction.
4.2 Heidegger’s reduction 40
In his analyses of the manners of being of Dasein, not only is Husserl’s idea
of intentionality ontologised, but the same happens to Husserl’s reduction: by
leading a variety of phenomena back (cf. reducere) to the ek-sistence of Dasein
as the event of the ontological difference, these phenomena are led back to their
verbality, or to their temporality. Reduction as an element of phenomenology
enables us to identify the “double life of the subject”, as Bernet calls it. The well-
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known form that it takes in Husserl is of a willed methodological enterprise of
reduction, by which a distinction is laid bare in the transcendental subject. The
double life of the Husserlian subject thus consists of the subject as constitutor of
the world (this is revealed by applying the method of reduction) and of the
subject as a spectator of the constitution of the world (this is the subject that
practises the method of reduction). When Heidegger then ontologises
phenomenology, he also describes a reduction by which a double life of Dasein
is exposed (as can be seen in Sein und Zeit): on the one hand, there is the non-
proper (uneigentliche) existence that exists dispersed in solicitude for people
and concern for things; on the other hand, there is the proper (eigentliche)
existence that is reconducted in anguish to care for itself alone.
Heidegger’s reduction, however, is no willed procedure of investigation. It
is rather an event that imposes itself on Dasein by means of something that is
lacking or matters. Let us have a look, in turn, at the two lives of Dasein as
exposed by the Heideggerian reduction.
With the first reduction, the structure of non-proper existence of one (das
Man), in other words, as one exists or as they exist, is exposed. Thus, for
example, one learns through the sudden dysfunction of a tool that Dasein is
always, in its everyday existence, taken up in a whole set of references by which
Dasein exists in the world and, in the same moment, the tool becomes
perceptible as object for the first time. Similarly, in missing a friend, for
instance, Dasein learns that one’s everyday existence is constituted by co-
existence (Mitsein) with other Dasein and so the other appears for the first time
as an object of representation. 
Dasein might well be always ontically itself, but ontologically it is dispersed
in the world and in co-existence daily.41 That Dasein is mostly and daily not itself
means that (although it remains ontically itself) it exists ontologically as a member
of an anonymous community where everybody exists as everyone does it, as they
do it, without distinguishing themselves from others. Most of the time, Dasein is
one-self, not himself or herself (or “yourself”) – this is exactly the reason why
phenomenology is needed in order to discover what Dasein itself actually is.42
And it is precisely when the other’s absence is suffered (when a form of reduction
is undergone) that the structure of co-existence becomes apparent.
The others, who are never understood by Heidegger as objects (in the sense
of Vorhandenes), nor even in the special sense of usability (zuhanden), but as
Dasein, are co-constitutors of a shared world (Mitwelt), a world of all and of
nobody in particular. This shared world is the world out of which Dasein
encounters the other Dasein; and in this encounter the common world is
(re-)constituted.43 In this world Dasein exists daily, most of the time as one
does it, deprived of its own most proper existence (eigentliche Existenz). In
short, who is Dasein most of the time? It is the Dasein of whom the entire
Being-understanding structure of existence (in other words, the ontological
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structure according to which Dasein exists) is always intricately constituted by
the fact of existing with others, with whom the world, the originary space and
coherence of meaning, is formed.
In the second reduction, which is undergone in anguish, the own existence
of Dasein comes to light as a whole. The familiar everyday world is not
annihilated in this reduction, nor does it invalidate what has been learned about
it, but in the experience of anguish, Dasein is withdrawn from its concern for
the things and solicitude for others and thrown back onto its own existence
alone. Dasein undergoes a reduction that does not cancel the ontological
structures of being-in-the-world or of being-with-others, but in which the
meaning thereof is deepened, namely by the fact that the temporal structure
thereof is laid bare: being-in-the-world and being-with-others are both
comprehended, not as qualities of a substantive subject, but as forms of ek-
sistence, that is, as ways in which Dasein exceeds its existence as a being into
the temporality of Being, as Heidegger puts it. Dasein discovers itself as the
event by which its manner of being as a being is transcended in a continuous
projection of its existence towards the future. It is to this fact of its existence that
Dasein owes the understanding quality of its existence; it is because Dasein
stands out into the temporality of the future that it is onto-logical or
metaphysical (in the terminology of the first Heidegger). This reduction is
executed (or not) independently of the initiative of Dasein. In this manner, its
understanding existence is revealed to Dasein according to a life-long play of
dis-covery and re-covery that is truth as a-letheia (according to the etymology
dear to Heidegger, “dis-coveredness”).
In brief, what remains after the second reduction is an isolated ek-static existence
proper to Dasein alone. This proper existence that no-one could undertake in the
place of Dasein, is the sum, the I amwithout an I-subject. The identity that Descartes
established between the I am and I think is problematised by an ek-static I am that
is decisive for, but outside of, the centre of the I think; the I (ego) of Dasein (the
thinking subject that writes books on ontology) is only a derivative form of a
more originary existence of the self (the sum) of Dasein (the ek-static I am that
exists always in a Being-understanding, [pre-]ontological manner).44
In Was ist Metaphysik?, Heidegger indicates that in anguish there is no “ist-
sagen”45 – in other words, anguish is an event in which no statement with the
copula “is” can be made; no judgements can be made. But if this is true, how
is it then possible for Heidegger to write afterwards on what Dasein discovers
during anguish? This is only possible in as far as one accepts a continuity
between Dasein in anguish and Dasein as author of philosophical texts. What
is the nature of this continuity which allows for an ontological exploration of
the event of anguish? It is a continuity of the question concerning the being that
lasts, of the Being-understanding existence, of the linguistic character of
understanding. The ontological constitution of Dasein can become afterwards
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a theme for a recollecting hermeneutics, thanks to this continuity between the
(I) am and the I think; the hermeneutic logos that Dasein is itself, lends itself to
an interpreting logos written on paper.46
5. From Marcel to Heidegger – an appreciation 
It may be possible to reconstruct historical circumstances that, around the
1920s, favoured the emergence of two philosophies that share certain
characteristics in form, content and character. However, the intention and aim
of this study is elsewhere. Isolating Marcel and Heidegger and concentrating on
their early, independent work could help us come to grips with a “transitional
junction” that constitutes one of the important episodes of the intellectual
history that formed a large number of us, their readers. I call this a “transitional
junction”, because the way in which intellectual history developed in France and
spread its influence over a large part of the world during the twentieth century
was such that Marcel came to enjoy a certain recognition and the matter for
which Marcel was a metonym facilitated the reception of Heidegger, whose
work subsequently superseded that of Marcel by far, at least in the recognition
Heidegger gained and the influence his work has exercised. It is in no sense my
intention to elevate Marcel to the predecessor of Heidegger or to reduce French
philosophical history to this episode. Instead, I merely aim to acknowledge and
appreciate this transitional junction as part of a complex of history: by an
examination of certain similarities within the delimited theme, the junction of
this transition can be highlighted; by insisting on the dissimilarities of these
two philosophies, the transitional character of the junction or historical
intersection of Marcel’s and Heidegger’s work can be elucidated.
The transitional junction depends on a re-interpretation of metaphysics that,
for all its originality in our two authors, could be said to be post-metaphysical,
in that it still attempts to drive further and radicalise, in different ways, the
Kantian project of the “end of metaphysics”. This re-interpretation of
metaphysics or elaboration of a philosophy that could be qualified as post-
metaphysical is radical enough to bring the entire philosophical project into
play, to provide a diagnosis of its failures and to arrange an extremely important
place for the everyday experience and activity in philosophical reflection. In
Marcel, more clearly than in Heidegger, this endeavour has a definite socio-
critical and socio-therapeutic intention. Furthermore, whether it be the
phenomenological deconstruction (Heidegger) or second reflection (Marcel),
the new vision of philosophy and the different vision for its scope and task call
for a new way of going about the task, in other words, of doing philosophy.
These ambitions of both Marcel and Heidegger can be traced very clearly in
their respective quests for a different point of access to or a different way to
interpret the human being. I would like to stress that, for all the similarities
between these two endeavours, the language and aim of the project are
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markedly dissimilar: Marcel’s focus is with the individual human life;
Heidegger is intent on helping his readers to hear anew the question of the
meaning of “to be”, of Being. However, a number of central gestures in these
two projects are so similar that they tend to strengthen one another, despite any
differences there might be. We have seen the importance of a specific kind of
criticism of the Cartesian subject which leads to a decentring of the subject to
something that is decisive. The conscious life of the subject is not negated but
relativised and is shown to be decisively conditioned by that “something” that
decentres it. The intelligence of the pre-predicative or non-representational life
of the subject is recognised by what could, in both cases, be called “reduction”.
It remains essential to these forms of access to the post-metaphysical notion of
the human to argue for the possibility and why of following the path of
intelligibility from the pre-predicative to the predicative. And all of this is
carried out in a philosophical practice that either is primarily (Heidegger) or
secondarily (Marcel) concerned with the old question of Being.
In the work of these two philosophers, one can see a passion that drove them:
in Marcel, it is an explicit compassion with fellow human beings in a time of
the dominance of first reflection and its social consequences; in Heidegger, it
is an implicit ethos of the proper (eigentliche) existence in a time of
forgetfulness of Being. The analyses above have foregrounded a number of
comparable structural characteristics in these two passions – this should
certainly be seen as among the reasons for which these two authors have been
associated so easily. But whereas this association is fairly easy to make, it is
particularly difficult to tell what the most appropriate manner is to co-ordinate
these two quests (in the sense of the two driving questions) with each other. In
principle, if we suspend the question of the talent with which each pursued his
respective quest, it seems to me impossible to accord a priority either to the
question “who am I?” or to the question “how is Dasein?” to which Marcel and
Heidegger respectively answered so passionately. I do not know if one has to
agree with Marcel when he comments as follows on the level of personal choice
involved in human initiative:
[T]he fact that a human decision can intervene only on a level where in some way, in any case
the decisive initiatives do not ensue from the human being – this fact seems to constitute to a
certain extent something like a common denominator between Heidegger’s thought and mine. For
him, as for me, there is no question of seeing in a human choice the origin or source of values.47
However, this statement does, at least, caution readers against too rash a
conclusion concerning the relative merit of the two respective projects and the
impartiality with which their inheritors were involved in this transitional
junction. Nor should such a word of caution be taken too seriously: no clarity
on this matter seems necessary for one to appropriate or to succumb to the
passion that drives these philosophies.
Department of Philosophy, University of Pretoria
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